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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. APPELLATE CASE No. 
SALAZAR 20010297-CA 
Plaintiffs - Appellants 
-vs-
THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, 
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. 
a Utah Corporation, ROBERT L. 
CHRISTENSEN, and 
NORMAN WILKINSON 
Defendants and Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs / Appellants Mr and Mrs. Salazar ("Salazar") bring this appeal 
from a final order of the Third District Court of Salt lake County, Utah (see 
Addendum A). This appeal is taken pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure Title II and was referred to this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
W. Did the Third District Court properly dismiss the action as to Mr. 
Christensen claiming the Salazars' allegations failed as a matter of law to 
state a cognizable claim against Christensen? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The propriety of a dismissal of a party's claims 
presents a question of law, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial 
court's conclusions for correctness, granting them no deference. 
Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc.. 976 P. 2d 1209 (Utah 1999); Lopez v. 
Union Pacific Railroad, 932 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1997). 
B. Is a motion to dismiss appropriate when, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs 
could recover under the facts alleged? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness 
with no deference to the trial court. U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co.. 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989)." Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen 
& Senior, 907 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995)? 
C. Should Plaintiffs / Appellees be permitted to amend their complaint? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, 
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U.R.C.P. rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed when determining the 
sufficiency of a plaintiffs' complaint," Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352,1353 
(Utah 1986) and the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be 
so construed as to do substantial Justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f).. Allegations 
include facts and reasonable inferences therefrom. Cruz v. Middlekauff 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996). As to such legal 
questions, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the trial court's conclusions 
for correctness, granting them no deference. Workman v. Brighton 
Properties, Inc., 976 P. 2d 1209, para. 2 (Utah 1999); Lopez v. Union Pacific 
Railroad, 932 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1997). 
D. Can both an entity and its alter ego be liable for full damages caused by a 
breach of an employment agreement and, furthermore, is Christensen, as a 
shareholder of Thrifty Nickel of Orem protected from suit by plaintiffs' 
contract action? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness 
with no deference to the trial court. Both an entity and its alter ego are 
liable for full damages caused by a breach of an employment agreement 
See Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Products, 893 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1995). 
Corporate officers and shareholders are not, per se, exempt from personal 
liability. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. 786 P.2d 1350(Utah 1990). 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Jose and Mildred Salazar, were rewarded with an Employment 
Agreement1, dated 1-1-1992, for their years of loyal service to Robert L. 
Christensen, owner of the Thrifty Nickel empire2. The Agreement gave the 
Salizars certain employment, severance, and retirement benefits. 
Mr. Christensen was involved as an author of the Employment Agreement 
and authorized its signing. Mr. Christensen has refused to provide post-
employment compensation and other benefits in accordance with the terms of 
the Agreement. 
After unsuccessfully making demands of Mr. Christensen for payment, 
the Salazar7s filed suit3 on August 8, 2000, seeking recovery of funds owed to 
them. The Third District Court issued an Order for Alternative Service on 
December 6, 2000 after Mr. Christensen avoided service for nearly four months. 
Salazar's also brought suit against several Thrifty Nickel companies and officers 
all of which have been dismissed. 
1
. See Addendum C 
2
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,16 & 7. 
3
. Complaint, see Addendum B. 
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Mr. Christensen has not answered the complaint against him but filed a 
December 28,2000 Motion to Dismiss4 plaintiffs' complaint. The motion's only 
averment was that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 5, 2001, Mr. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss came on for 
hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. After oral argument Judge Frederick 
granted the Motion with an Order issued on March 14, 20015. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Salazars seek to have the order of the lower court reversed with the 
matter remanded for further proceedings including amendment of the 
complaint. 
4
. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is found in Addendum G. 
5
. See Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs, Jose and Mildred Salazar, were rewarded with an Employment 
Agreement6, dated 1-1-1992, for their ten years7 of loyal service to their friend8 
Robert L. Christensen, owner of the Thrifty Nickel empire9. The Employment 
Agreement was an inducement10 for the Salazar's to move their place of 
employment to Utah11. The Agreement gave the Salizars certain employment, 
severance, and retirement benefits. 
Mr. Christensen played a part in drafting12 the Employment Agreement, 
was aware of its terms, approved the document13 and authorized his son, Tim 
Taylor, to sign14 it on behalf of the Thrifty Nickel companies. Mr. Christensen 
6
. See Addendum C 
7
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01, 12. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated 
11 Jan 01, 12. See Addendums D & E. 
8
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01, 1 7. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated 
11 Jan 01, 1 7. 
9
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,16 & 7. 
10
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,1f3. See Addendum F. 
". Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,13. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated 
11 Jan 01,13. 
12
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,14. 
13
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,16. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar 
dated 11 Jan 01,16. 
14
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,15. 
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reaffirmed the validity of the Employment Agreement in 199915 despite a change 
in the company name16. Mr. Christensen has refused to provide post-
employment compensation and other benefits in accordance with the terms of 
the Agreement. Plaintiffs, both over 65 years of age, were summarily terminated 
without cause from their employment on April 28, 2000. 
After making demands of Mr. Christensen for payment, the Salazar's filed 
suit17 on August 8, 2000, alleging, inter alia, that their friend Mr. Christensen 
owned in whole or in part many of the Thrifty Nickel companies, that he 
personally controls the operations of more or less 86 entities publishing 
classified advertisement newspapers throughout the United States, most of 
which publish under the banner "Thrifty Nickel/7 Mr. Christensen is the sole 
shareholder of Want Ads of Salt Lake and Southern Cross Co., a member of the 
board of directors, and, truly, the alter ego of the Thrifty Nickel businesses. 
Further, the Salazars complained that there should be no corporate veil 
distinguishing or protecting the assets of the defendant18. The Third District 
Court issued an Order for Alternative Service on December 6, 2000 after Mr. 
15
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01, If9. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated 
11 Jan 01,19. 
16
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01, | 6 . 
17
. Complaint, see Addendum B. 
18
. Complaint, paragraph 37. 
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Christensen avoided service for nearly four months. Salazar's also brought suit 
against several Thrifty Nickel companies and officers all of which have been 
dismissed. 
Mr. Christensen has not answered the complaint against him but filed a 
December 28,2000 Motion to Dismiss19 plaintiffs7 complaint. The motion's only 
averment was that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. He attempted to expand the grounds for dismissal in his 
accompanying memorandum claiming that, as a shareholder of Thrifty Nickel, 
plaintiffs' contract action against him is barred or that the alleged facts fail to 
support a claim of piercing the corporate veil against him. 
Mr. Christensen was dismissed by the Third District Court over objections 
of the Salazars. Their request to amend their complaint, if needed, to adequately 
allege damages by Mr. Christensen was ignored. Though discovery and a 
deposition of Mr. Christensen had been noticed-up by the Salazars20, they were 
not allowed to proceed with development of their case against Mr. Christensen. 
19
. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is found in Addendum G. 
20
'. Plaintiffs mailed a Notice of Deposition to defendants attorney, Scott Call, on 
February 27, 2001 for an April 24, 2001 deposition. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. Plaintiffs' Complaint, as a matter of law, states a cognizable claim against 
Christensen. 
The complaint, supplemented with plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss supplemented with three 
affidavits, sets forth the facts of the case and provides a basis for relief. 
"A grant of a motion to dismiss is proper 'only where it appears that the 
plaintiff... would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any 
state of facts they could prove to support their claim.' Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 
828 P.2d 496,499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 
(Utah 1991))." Hobbs v. Labor Commission, 991 P.2d 590, (Utah 1999). As to 
such legal questions, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's 
conclusions for correctness, granting them no deference. Workman v. Brighton 
Properties, Inc., 976 P. 2d 1209, para. 2 (Utah 1999); Lopez v. Union Pacific 
Railroad, 932 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1997). 
In the case of Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 
(Utah 1996) the issue was the reverse of the present case. The District Court had 
refused to dismiss the action. The court concluded that "the trial court properly 
denied [defendant's] rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because under the alleged 
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facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the complaint states a claim upon 
which relief can be granted/7 (emphasis added) 
Case law is replete with clear edicts that, "A motion to dismiss is 
appropriate only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would 
not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they 
could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)); see also, 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1360 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the liberality 
of notice pleading". DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Company, 835 P.2d 1000, (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Plaintiffs alleged facts21 which, when proven at trial, will show defendant 
Robert Christensen to be liable for damages suffered. "A motion to dismiss is 
appropriate only when it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could 
not recover under the facts alleged. U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Lowe v. Sorenson Research 
Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989)." Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995). 
. See the complaint in Addendum B, and plaintiffs' affidavits in Addendums C & D. 
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A. Utah is a notice pleading state requiring pleadings to be construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Utah is a notice pleading state. The text of rule 8 itself declares that "all 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial Justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). 
In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed 
when determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs7 complaint," Gill v. Timm, 720 
P.2d 1352,1353 (Utah 1986) and 
The claim need not be specific, rather, "under Utah's liberal notice 
pleading requirements, all that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient to 
give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general 
indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 
969 P.2d 403,406 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See 
also Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352,1353 (Utah 1986) and Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 
Utah 2d 157,161,280 P.2d 453,455 (1955)). 
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, "[w]e construe the facts in the complaint 
liberally and we consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427,430 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Our review of the motion to dismiss presents a question of 
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law, which we review for correctness, giving "the trial court's ruling no 
deference." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194,196 
(Utah 1991). Busche v. Salt Lake County. 2001 UT App 111 (Utah App. 
04/05/2001). 
Under rules of notice pleading, it is sufficient that defendants be given 
only a fair idea of the nature of the claims asserted against them sufficient to 
apprize them of the general basis of the claim. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216 
(N.M. App. 1997) Plaintiffs' complaint, memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion to dismiss, and affidavits were more than adequate to 
inform Mr Christensen that the Salazars held him to be personally involved in 
their employment contract and that they sought to hold him personally liable for 
their damages. 
Mr. Christensen was well aware of the allegations against him and took 
action to avoid service of summons. In total, his involvement in drafting the 
Employment Agreement22, his avoidance of service23, and other alleged facts 
constitute fair notice of alter ego and piercing the corporate veil as discussed 
later in this brief. 
22
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,14. 
23
. Plaintiffs' Motion to Serve Defendant Robert L. Christensen by Mail and Minute 
Entry Ruling. See Addendum H. 
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"Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the 
liberality of notice pleading, and must be granted only when it is apparent that 
under no set of facts proven in support of the claim as pleaded would a party be 
entitled to relief." Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1360 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990)). 
B. Appellants should be given an opportunity through discovery to prove 
that Mr. Christensen was, in fact, a party to the Employment Contract. 
Many facts are in dispute in the current matter. Defendant has not yet 
answered plaintiffs' complaint. It is, therefore, unclear, precisely which facts are 
in dispute. 
Many facts are yet to be discovered. Plaintiff had filed its First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on February 27, 2001. 
These remain unanswered and are attached as Addendum I. Among other yet 
undiscovered important issues are the following: 
1. What was the extent of defendant's involvement in any of the defendant 
corporations? 
2. Does defendant now or did he previously own stock in any corporation 
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that is listed as a defendant in this lawsuit? If so, how many shares does 
he now own or has he previously owned and what percentage of 
ownership does this represent? 
3. What input has defendant had into the making of or knowledge of the 
existence of the Employment Agreement with plaintiffs? 
4. Has defendant ever served as a director, officer, or representative of any of 
the Thrifty Nickel companies? 
5. Did defendant ever loan money to any of the defendant corporations? If 
so, state when and the amount, and the balance still owed on each loan. 
6. Did any of the defendant corporations loan defendant any money? 
7. Did defendant ever guaranty or cosign any obligation of any of the 
defendant corporations? 
8. Did any of the defendants ever advance funds to defendant Christensen 
for services to be performed later? 
9. At any time since 1996 , did you incorporate or cause to be incorporated 
any other corporation? 
Defendant owns a national network of classified newspapers under the 
"Thrifty Nickel" banner. Defendant's personal relationship and involvement in 
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the operations of these newspapers can only be uncovered in the discovery 
process. 
These questions are critical to defendant's liability under the subject 
Employment Agreement. A checklist of 17 facts and circumstances tending to 
show that a corporate president is alter ego of a corporation is found in 18 Am 
Jur 2d, Corporations, §53. 
The lower court assumed Mr. Christensen was protected behind the 
corporate veil. This presumption can be rebutted. When rebutted, the 
discharged employee may have a claim for breach of contract. Berube v. Fashion 
Centre. 771 P.2d 1033 at 1044 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), 1051 
(Zimmerman, J., Concurring in the result); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis 
Utah. Inc.. No. 20246,114 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 111 P.2d 483 (June 28,1989). 
Under the factual allegations of the complaint, the Salizars have stated such a 
claim for breach of contract. Construing their allegations in a light most 
favorable to the Salazars, the facts support a claim for contract damages. See 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771 P.2d 1033 at 1044-46 (Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.), 1050 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., Concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.), 1052-53 
(Zimmerman, J., Concurring in the result); Caldwell, slip op. at 7. "Therefore, 
we vacate the grant of the motion to dismiss and remand for further 
proceedings." Lowe v. Sorenson, 779 P.2d 668, (Utah 1989). 
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There exist many questions of fact in the appealed case. Discovery had 
barely begun. The Salazars listed some 25 issues of fact that were still in dispute. 
It was premature for the Court to dismiss the action. 
The District Court had at its disposable an alternative to dismissal that 
would have much better served the needs of justice. In an earlier case, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that further discovery was needed, "The trial court 
denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice and allowed the parties 120 days 
for discovery... to determine whether a written employment contract existed 
between the parties/' Lowe v. Sorenson Reasearch Co., 779 P.2d 668, (Utah 
1989). 
II. The Third District Court should have limited its scope to the single issue 
brought out in the Motion to Dismiss. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaint narrowly focused on only 
one allegation, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Defendant then attempts to expand the requested grounds for 
dismissal in his accompanying memorandum claiming that, as a shareholder of 
Thrifty Nickel, plaintiffs' contract action against him is barred or that the alleged 
facts fail to support a claim of piercing the corporate veil against him. 
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Judge Frederick's decision stated "All that's alleged is that Mr. 
Christensen was an owner, that he had knowledge of the contract... the sum 
total of the allegations incident to Christensen's involvement here do not give 
fair notice of a claim of attempt to breach corporate vei l . . ." 
It becomes obvious that Judge Frederick may not have recently read the 
complaint. The complaint (See Addendum B) contains the following allegations 
against Mr. Christensen: 
5. Defendant Robert L. Christensen (Christensen) is an individual believed to 
reside in the State of Florida and doing business in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
7. Plaintiffs entered into a written Employment Agreement with 
Defendant(s) Thrifty Nickel on January 1,1992. A copy of the 
Employment Agreement, marked Exhibit 1 [Addendum B herein], is 
attached and made a part of this pleading. 
19. Plaintiffs worked continuously and diligently under their Employment 
Agreement for defendants receiving pay checks for succeeding and 
inconsistently intermixed periods from Thrifty Nickel, WASL, Southern 
Cross, and others. 
21. Thrifty Nickel was and is owned in whole or part by defendant 
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Christensen. 
28. Defendant Christensen is the controlling shareholder of more or less eight-
six (86) entities publishing classified advertisement newspapers through 
the United States, most of which publish under the banner "Thrifty 
Nickel." 
29. Defendant Christensen is the sole shareholder of WASL and Souther 
Cross. 
30. "Advertise it in Your Dynamic Thrifty Nickel Want Ads" is a trademark 
registered on July 13,1992 in Utah and owned by defendant Christensen 
or an entity ultimately owned and / or controlled by defendant 
Christensen. 
32. In addition to being the sole shareholder of WASL, defendant Christensen 
is a member of its board of directors. 
36. The transfers of assets [between the three corporate defendants] occurred 
at the direction of defendants Christensen and / or Wilkinson. 
37. There should be no corporate veil distinguishing or protecting the assets 
of any of the five defendants, (emphasis added.) 
The basis for Judge Frederick's decision is patently in error. Allegations in 
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the complaint and related reasonable inferences present a case against Mr. 
Christensen which, at the very least, are adequate to sustain the case well into 
the discovery process. 
III. The Complaint gives fair notice that Christensen, as owner of the Thrifty 
Nickel companies, is not immune to a personal employment contract with 
friends and employees. 
Focus must remain on Christensen's personal authorization24 of the initial 
Employment Agreement and his ratification of the contract at a later date25. This 
has been alleged and will be clearly and conclusively shown at trial. 
Plaintiffs' complaint is supported by their memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion to dismiss and three supporting affidavits submitted in 
opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. See Addendums D, E and F. The 
motion and supporting affidavits verify the complaint and must be considered 
as support of the complaint. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We have 
indicated that general allegations in an unverified complaint are an insufficient 
basis for opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment. D & L 
24
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01, f l & 5. 
25
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,19. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar 
dated 11 Jan 01,19. 
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Supply v.Saurini, 775 P.2d 420; Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224,226-27 (Utah 
1983). Thayne simply did not meet his burden of presenting some evidence, by 
affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of material fact. Dupler v. Yates, 
10 Utah 2d 251,351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah I960)." Thane v. Beneficial Life. 874 P.2d 
120, (1994). Plaintiffs in this case did raise "credible issues of material fact." 
Plaintiffs' affidavits state that plaintiffs entered into an Employment 
Contract on January 1,1992. Plaintiffs have plead and will prove that 
Christensen knew of and, as may be shown in discovery, suggested the 
Employment Agreement26 as a reward and inducement27 for plaintiffs' to move 
to Utah.28 
Christensen was a party29 to the Employment Agreement. He approved 
the document30 and personally authorized Tim Taylor, as his agent31, to sign the 
Employment Agreement. 
At trial, the facts will show that Christensen personally benefitted from 
26
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , 1 6 & 7. 
21
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , J3. 
28
. Affidavit of T im Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , | 3 . Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 
0 1 , p . Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated 11 Jan 0 1 , f 3 . 
29
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 0 1 , | 6 . Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar 
dated 11 Jan 0 1 , 1 6 . 
30
. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , f l . 
3
'. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , %5. 
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the services of plaintiffs. In addition to his close friendship evidenced by many 
specific requests for personal services and inviting them over for holiday meals, 
he valued their significant contributions to his growing organizations.32 
Defendant Christensen reaffirmed the validity of the Employment 
Agreement and his commitment to it in return for the Salazars' services in 
August of 1999 when transferring Salazars to another Thrifty Nickel company.33 
IV. Plaintiffs' have alleged facts to support a claim of piercing the corporate 
veil and alter ego against Christensen 
Both an entity and its alter ego are liable for full damages caused by a 
breach of an employment agreement See Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Products, 
893 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1995). Corporate officers and shareholders are not, per se, 
exempt from personal liability. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 
1350(Utah 1990). 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss states on page 
4 that a shareholder cannot be personally liable for corporate debts. Likewise, 
32
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 0 1 , f 7 . Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar 
dated 11 Jan 01, f 7. 
33
. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,1f9. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar 
dated 11 Jan 0 1 , %9. 
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defendant's Motions incorrectly focuses on the necessity of 'piercing the 
corporate veil' in order for an officer to become liable to debts. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagrees and has refuted this position as stated 
in Richard W. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350(Utah 1990), 
" In order to disregard the corporate entity, two circumstances must be 
shown: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the 
corporation is, instead, the alter-ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) if 
observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity. Colman v Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) See also Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 
42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). One of the factors deemed significant in 
determining whether this test has been met is the use of the corporation as 
a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder. Colman v. Colman, 
743 P.2d at 786. At the beginning of trial, the court stated that Gardner 
and Hernandez were personally liable under the April agreement and the 
trial proceeded with that ruling in place. The court found that Gardner 
and Hernandez were the real parties in interest, that they were intended 
as parties to the agreement, and that "Dinero Services Inc. was not 
considered by the parties as an operative entity as far as the dealings 
between the parties were concerned." These findings are supported by the 
evidence, especially considering the history of transactions in this matter, 
and meet the required legal criteria for piercing the corporate veil. 
Therefore, the court did not err in holding Gardner and Hernandez 
personally liable to Poggio under the April agreement." (emphasis added) 
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This same reasoning is supported in learned treatises and univerally 
accepted legal authorities. " Alter ego is an equitable doctrine which allows 
courts the discretion to disregard a corporate entity and hold individuals 
responsible for acts done in the name of a corporation. See Black's Law 
Dictionary 77-78 (6th ed. 1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 
596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), established a two-prong test to determine whether a 
court may disregard the corporate entity under the alter ego doctrine: (1) there 
must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in 
fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable 
result would follow/' Id. at 1030. " Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarick, 327 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 45 (Utah 1997). 
Further clarification of the line between being protected and being liable is 
found in the following reasoning, 
"Generally, a corporation is treated as a legal entity separate from its 
shareholders, thereby permitting shareholders to commit limited capital 
to the corporation with the assurance that they will have no personal 
liability for the corporation's debts. Krendl & Krendl, "Piercing the 
Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry", 55 Den. L. J. 1 (1978). When, 
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however, the corporate structure is used so improperly that the continued 
recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity would be unfair, 
the corporate entity may be disregarded and corporate principals held 
liable for the corporation's actions. Id. at 2. 
"Thus, if it is shown that shareholders used the corporate entity as a mere 
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs without regard to 
separate and independent corporate existence, or for the purpose of 
defeating or evading important legislative policy, or in order to perpetrate 
a fraud or wrong on another, equity will permit the corporate form to be 
disregarded and will hold the shareholders personally responsible for the 
corporation's improper actions. See Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 161 
Colo. 342,350,421 P.2d 735, 739 (1966); Gutheil v. Polichio. 103 Colo. 426, 
431,86 P.2d 972,974 (1939); Lafond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367,369 (Colo. 
App. 1984); Krendl & Krendl, supra at 28-43. 
In the absence of a fully developed factual record and adequate findings 
of fact, however, we cannot determine whether that equitable doctrine 
should be applied here. We leave it to the hearing officer to resolve this 
issue on remand of the case." Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (CO 1986) 
(emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs will prove at trial that the assets of the various Thrifty Nickel 
companies are maintained at artificially low levels. This will further expose 
defendant Christensen to personal liability as, "It is coming to be recognized as 
the policy of the law that shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the 
business unencumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective 
liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be 
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done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity 
privileged Salt Lake City Corporation v. James, 761 P.2d 42. (emphasis added) 
Alter ego is a question of fact. An exhaustive list of areas need to be 
explored to determine Robert Christensen's involvement in this case. Such 
questions include the following: (both past and present tense) 
1. What office(s) has Mr. Christensen held within the Thrifty 
Nickel" organization? 
2. What corporate structures have existed in the past ten years? 
3. Is he the ultimate authority in the company's dealings? 
4. Is he the primary owner? 
5. Is he the dominant personality in the organization? 
6. Has Mr. Christensen been a key decision-maker for the 
various companies? 
7. What is his salary and remuneration history? 
8. Has there been intermixing of various companies' accounts? 
9. Is there sufficient ownership and interest to support the alter 
ego contentions? 
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10. Have his companies been undercapitalized? 
11. Has there been unauthorized diversion of funds? 
12. Has Mr. Christensen treated corporate assets as his own? 
13. Have all company formalities been observed? 
14. Were personal and corporate funds intermingled? 
15. Is Mr. Christensen the sole or dominant shareholder? 
16. Did he play a key role in establishing or directing corporate 
policies? 
17. Have corporate assets been misstated from time to time? 
18. Has allegedly criminal activity been directed by Mr. 
Christensen? 
19. Has the corporation been used as part of a scheme to promote 
activities in opposition to the public interest? 
20. Is there common or overlapping stock ownership, directors or 
officers between the various Thrifty Nickel companies? 
21. What loans have transpired between Mr. Christensen and the 
companies? 
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22. Who was instrumental in incorporating the various 
companies? 
23. How have tax returns been handled? 
24. Were various Thrifty Nickel companies allowed to operate 
independently? 
25. What contracts exist between the Thrifty Nickel companies 
and any parent company? 
Many of these questions are raised in plaintiffs' currently outstanding 
First Interrogatories and Request for Production (see Addendum I). Others will 
be addressed in Mr. Christensen's deposition and in later discovery. Whether 
Thrifty Nickel can be shown to be the alter ego of Robert Christensen will e 
proven upon completion of plaintiffs' discovery. 
Both an entity and its alter ego are liable for full damages caused by a 
breach of an employment agreement. In the 1995 Utah case of Diston v. 
EnviroPak Medical Products, 893 P.2d 1071, Judge David E. Roth and Frank G. 
Noel, JJ, held that an employee could collect damages from both the parent 
company and its alter ego. On appeal by the company, Judge Wilkins affirmed 
that a plaintiff (Diston) claiming damages under an employment contract could 
collect damages from both a company (Surgical) and its alter ego company 
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(EnviroPak). 
EnviroPak, like Thrifty Nickel of Orem, went broke. The court held, 
nevertheless, " . . . the fact that EnviroPak was losing money, or not making 
enough money, may provide Surgical with a legitimate reason for ending its 
operations, but it does not excuse the obligations of EnvirPak. 
"Surgical, as the alter ego of EnviroPak, is liable for the full damages 
caused by EnviroPak's breach of the . . . employment agreement with Mr. 
Diston. Surgical is liable, under an alter ego theory, for the obligations incurred 
by EnviroPak/7 
V. Judge Frederick did not consider the issue of amending the Complaint. 
Plaintiffs / Appellees should be permitted to amend their complaint to 
cover any potential shortcomings. This alternative was requested by plaintiffs in 
their Motion in Opposition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The effect of technical deficiencies in a complaint were handled well in 
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268 (Utah 1996) 
wherein the late Judge Stirba wrote, 
" . . . the defect in the complaint about which SPI complains is nothing 
more than a technicality. In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule 
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8(a) "is to be liberally construed when determining the sufficiency of a 
plaintiffs complaint," Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352,1353 (Utah 1986) and 
the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be so construed as 
to do substantial Justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). The days of strict adherence 
to draconian formalities at the pleading stage are over. Rather, "the 
fundamental purpose of the liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties 
'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have 
pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement that their 
adversaries have 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Williams 
v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). 
The decision continues, 
" The principals in SPI and Rockin' Robin were the same, and Lowe, a vice 
president and general counsel of SPI and shareholder of Rockin Robin, 
negotiated the assignment of the lease and was heavily involved in the 
project from the beginning. In addition, it is apparent from the defenses 
raised by SPI that it understood precisely what claims were being made 
and to which agreement they pertained. Under these circumstances, there 
can be no doubt that SPI had notice of Consolidated's claim and that SPI 
was not unfairly prejudiced. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b)." 
V. Judge Frederick failed to consider equity. 
Judge Frederick introduced his decision by stating, "On a motion to 
dismiss, the issue of the equitable nature of the claims asserted by the respective 
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parties is really beyond the scheme of my inquiry here, Mr. Houser." See the 
Hearing Transcript page 12 found in Addendum J. 
But for the seriousness of plaintiffs' claim, Judge Frederick's introductory 
statement would be humorous. The definition of alter ego, on which he based 
his decision reads " Alter ego is an equitable doctrine which . . . " See Black's Law 
Dictionary 77-78 (6th ed. 1990). It is an oxymoron for Judge Frederick to say that 
equity cannot be considered in a motion to dismiss and then order the dismissal 
based on an equitable doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that" . . . a trial court's "discretion 
should be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Helgesen 
v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079,1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co.. 123 Utah 416,420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953) quoted in Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 75 (Utah 09/22/2000). This statement appears in a case overturning a 
Default Judgment. The instant case is of a similar nature. The Salazars, if this 
case is dismissed with prejudice, may well be without further remedy and left 
without pension throughout their retirement. This court can prevent this gross 
injustice! 
The present case involves the sensitive issue of an elderly couples' 
entitlement to retirement benefits. In a similarly sensitive divorce case where 
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the trial court had considered equitable matters in its decision, this court stated, 
"Given these facts, the equitable nature of divorce proceedings, and the court's 
continuing jurisdiction in divorce cases, there was no reversible error in the trial 
court's consideration of the order to show cause along with the petition to 
modify. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1998) (establishing court's continuing 
jurisdiction); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., 
Concurring) (noting that law of the case doctrine does not prevent court from 
"catching a mistake and fixing it")/' Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,361 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 15 (Utah App. 01/22/1999). 
In the instant case, allowing Mr. Christensen to hide behind the corporate 
form would sanction fraud, promote injustice, and result in inequity. In such 
cases, the corporate entity is disregarded. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994). 
Page 35 of 38 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Utah Court of Appeals construes 
"the facts in the complaint liberally and we consider all the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the back in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.34 
Judge Frederick erred in ruling that plaintiffs' complaint, memoranda, 
affidavits and reasonable inferences therefrom35 were insufficient to give the 
defendant Robert Christensen "fair notice" and "a "fair idea of the nature of the 
claims asserted against them sufficient to apprise them"36 of the nature and basis 
of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. 
The liberality of notice pleading acknowledges that dismissal is a severe 
measure.37 All pleadings must be construed as to do substantial justice.38 If 
necessary, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint.39 
Further, the equitable nature of the alter ego and piercing the corporate 
veil doctrines, mandate that once fair notice is given, the facts of the case must 
[
. Baker v. Angus, supra 
. See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury. Inc., supra. 
'. Garcia v. Coffman. supra 
. See Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. supra 
;
. U.R.C.P §8(f) 
'. Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter. Inc.. supra 
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be ascertained through discovery and trial. Many facts remain in dispute. Many 
facts are yet to be discovered. Plaintiffs will prove the defendant has no valid 
defenses. 
WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully prays that the order of the 
lower court be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2001. 
Conrad B. Houser 
Attorney for Plaintiff - Appellant 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on August 2,2001, a copy of the Notice of Appeal was hand 
delivered personally by me to: 
Scott A. Call 
James H. Tily 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006. 
Conrad B. Houser 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. 
SALAZAR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THIRFTY NICKLE OF OREM, INC., a 
Utah corporation; WANT ADS OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; SOUTHERN CROSS, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and 
NORMAN WILKINSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 000906212 
Judge Frederick 
Defendant Robert L. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint came 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick on Monday, March 5, 2001, 
9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, Conrad B. Houser. 
AUUmNUUlVI i 
Defendant Robert L. Christensen was represented by his counsel of record, Scott A. Call of 
Anderson & Karrenberg. 
The Court, having reviewed the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant Robert L. 
Christensen's Motion to Dismiss and supporting memoranda and the Plaintiffs' opposing 
memoranda, having heard the argument of counsel thereon and good cause appearing 
therefore, hereby makes and enters the following order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendant Robert L. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss is 
granted for the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed in support of Defendant Robert L. 
Christensen's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, all claims in this action against Defendant 
Robert L. Christensen are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED: l^March ^ ,2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/Qonradli. Houser 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that on this Jjj_ day of March, 2001, and following entry thereof, I caused 
to be placed in the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, to: 
Conrad B. Houser, Esq. 
175 South Main Street, Ste 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Ste 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
CV. few 
Clerk 
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Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
175 South Main Street 
Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs 
-vs- Judge YjJL d^AM^k. 
THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah Corporation, 
ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and 
NORMAN WILKINSON 
Defendants 
PLAINTIFFS, JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR file this action for breach of an 
Employment Agreement and other employment related damages against DEFENDANTS, 
THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, INC., a Utah Corporation, WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah Corporation, ROBERT L. 
CHRISTENSEN, and NORMAN WILKINSON. In support of this action, Plaintiff will show 
the Court the following: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiffs are both residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
District Court Civil No. 
2. Defendant Thrifty Nickel of Or em, Inc. (Thrifty Nickel) is revoked predecessor Utah 
company of Defendant Southern Cross, Inc. and was controlled by Defendant Robert 
L. Christensen. 
3. Defendant Want Ads of Salt Lake City, Inc. (WASL) is a closely-held Nevada 
corporation incorporated on or about June 20,1997, first registered in Utah on 
September 23,1997, and with offices in and doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
from its office at 7097 South State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047. 
4. Defendant Southern Cross, Inc. (Southern Cross) is a closely-held Utah corporation 
incorporated on or about May 5,1992 and with offices in and doing business in Utah 
and Salt Lake Counties, Utah. 
5. Defendant Robert L. Christensen (Christensen) is an individual believed to reside in 
the State of Florida and doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
6. Defendant Norman Wilkinson (Wilkinson) is an individual residing in Utah County, 
State of Utah and doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. Plaintiffs entered into a written Employment Agreement with Defendant(s) Thrifty 
Nickel on January 1,1992. A copy of the Employment Agreement, marked Exhibit 1, is 
attached and made a part of this pleading. 
8. The Employment Agreement, containing no stated term, was perpetual. 
9. The Employment Agreement stipulated a weekly salary to the Plaintiffs jointly of 
$1,400 per week. 
10. Plaintiffs, under the terms of the Employment Agreement, were to perform as 
"Distribution Managers including; logging routes, hiring drivers, distributing the 
Thrifty Nickel, getting new locations, upkeep of all indoor and outdoor racks, dealing 
with the printer and any other assigned company initiatives as required/7 
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11. Duties as stated in the Employment Agreement were to be performed in "the Orem, 
Provo, and Salt Lake City, Utah area and at such other place(s) as the needs, business, 
or opportunities of the Employer may require from time to time.,/ 
12. Benefits under the Employment Agreement included vacation of 3 weeks (after 1996) 
"with salary paid in full." 
13. Benefits under the Employment Agreement included (after 1992), paid medical and 
dental insurance. 
14. Benefits under the Employment Agreement included (after 1992), retirement at age 65 
for 10 years in the amount of $600 per week for each of the plaintiffs. 
15. Plaintiffs are both over the age of 65. 
16. The Employment Agreement also provided for severance pay (after 1996) of six 
months pay if terminated without cause, this amount to be paid, upon request, as a 
lump sum at present value. 
17. The Employment Agreement also provided that "if litigation after termination without 
cause shall be brought to enforce or interpret any provision contained herein, 
Employer, to the extent permitted by applicable law, indemnifies Employees for 
Employee's reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred in such litigation." 
18. Plaintiffs worked for various Thrifty Nickel newspapers in New Mexico and Utah for 
over nineteen (19) years. 
19. Plaintiffs worked continuously and diligently under their Employment Agreement for 
defendants receiving pay checks for succeeding and inconsistently intermixed periods 
from Thrifty Nickel, WASL, Southern Cross, and others. 
20. On April 28, 2000, without cause, Plaintiffs were notified their Employment Agreement 
was terminated effective that same day. A copy of the termination, attached as Exhibit 
2, is made a part of this pleading. 
21. Thrifty Nickel was and is owned in whole or part by defendant Christensen. 
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22. Thrifty Nickel's right to operate in Utah was revoked by the Director of the Utah 
Division of Corporations. 
23. Thrifty Nickel's operations continued without significant interruption or change of 
procedures under ownership of defendant WASL or defendant Southern Cross. 
24. Defendant WASL purportedly ceased doing business on or about August 5,1999. 
25. Defendant WASL's operations continued without significant interruption or change of 
procedures under ownership of defendant Southern Cross. 
26. Newspapers and other publications selling classified advertisements using the name 
Thrifty Nickel, are published regularly in numerous markets throughout the United 
States. 
27. Thrifty Nickel newspapers are distributed through racks and depositories typically 
near the front entrance of businesses such as supermarkets, restaurants, and 
convenience stores. 
28. Defendant Christensen is the controlling shareholder of more or less eighty-six (86) 
entities publishing classified advertisement newspapers throughout the United States, 
most of which publish under the banner "Thrifty Nickel." 
29. Defendant Christensen is the sole shareholder of WASL and Southern Cross. 
30. "Advertise it in Your Dynamic Thrifty Nickel Want Ads" is a trademark registered on 
July 13,1992 in Utah and owned by defendant Christensen or an entity ultimately 
owned and / or controlled by defendant Christensen. 
31. Defendant WASL's authority to transact business in Utah was revoked on or about 
December 1,1998. 
32. In addition to being the sole shareholder of WASL, defendant Christensen is a member 
of its board of directors. 
33. Defendant Wilkinson has been associated with Christensen and various Thrifty Nickel 
enterprises for approximately twenty (20) years. 
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34. Defendant Wilkinson is president of both WASL and Southern Cross, and the treasurer 
and a director of Southern Cross. 
35. The transfer of assets between the three corporate defendants is alleged to be 
fraudulent under an action currently in process in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 99C-31762. 
36. The transfers of assets occurred at the direction of defendants Christensen and / or 
Wilkinson. 
37. There should be no corporate veil distinguishing or protecting the assets of any of the 
five defendants. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
38. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate herein the allegations of all preceding paragraphs. 
39. Defendants, in terminating plaintiffs without cause, breached the subject Employment 
Agreement. 
40. Plaintiffs are entitled to Severance Pay in the amount of six (6) months salary, the net 
present value of which, discounted at 5%, is $36,024.49 plus interest from April 28, 2000. 
41. Plaintiffs are each entitled to Retirement pay at the rate of $600 per month for ten (10) 
years which, discounted at 5%, is $505,928.07 plus interest from April 28, 2000. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN MEDICAL INSURANCE 
42. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate herein the allegations of all preceding paragraphs. 
43. Under the terms of the Employment Contract, Defendants are required to provide medical 
insurance coverage. Because of defendants' negligence in allowing the insurance to several 
times lapse and by failing to provide litigation defense, judgment was rendered against plaintiff 
Jose Salazar in the amount of $1,124.66. 
44. Plaintiff Jose Salazar is entitled to be compensated the full amount about of $1,124.66 plus 
interest and any related costs to rectify his credit rating. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
FAILURE TO PAY VACATION PAY 
45. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate herein the allegations of all preceding paragraphs. 
46. Under the terms of the Employment Contract, Defendants are required to provide for three 
weeks of annual vacation. 
47. Plaintiffs were not given vacation for the past three years. They are due, therefore, the 
net present value of which, discounted at 5%, is $ 15,292.20 plus interest from April 28, 
2000. 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief of at least $548,857 as follows: 
1. Judgement against the Defendants jointly and severally in the current amount of 
$505,929; 
2. Interest from April 28, 2000 currently totaling $15,028; 
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3. Court costs; 
4. Attorney's fees of $10,000 to bring this action; and 
5. Such other relief in the premises as shall be agreeable to equity and to which Plaintiffs 
are entitled. 
Dated this 8th day of August, 2000. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
?6nrad B. Houser 
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
This Employment Agreement ("This Agreement") is made effective as of 
January 1, 1992, Thrifty Nickel ("The Employer") of 712 South State, 
Orem,Utah. Jose S. Salazar and Mildred 0. Salazar ("The Employees")2239 
Tempview, Provo, Utah. 
A. Employer is engaged in the business of Publishing Classified 
Newspapers. 
B. Employer desires to have services of Employees. 
C. Employees are willing to be employed by Employer. 
Therefore, the parties agree as follows: 
1. EMPLOYMENT. Employees shall provide to Employer the following services: 
Distribution Managers including; logging routes, hiring drivers, distributing 
the Thrifty Nickel, getting new locations, upkeep of all indoor and outdoor 
racks, dealing with the printer and any other assigned company initiatives as 
required. 
2. BEST EFFORTS OF EMPLOYEES. Employees agree to perform faithfully, 
industriously and to the best of Employee's ability, experience and talents, 
all of the duties that may be required by the express and implicit terms of 
this Agreement, to the reasonable satisfaction of Employer. Such duties shall 
be provided at the Orem, Provo and Salt Lake City, Utah area and at "such other 
place(s) as the needs, business, or opportunities of the Employer may require 
from time to time. 
3. SALARY. Employer will make salary payments bi-weekly to the Employees in 
the amount of $700.00 each per week, for a total of $1400.00 per week. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONS. Employees shall provide Employer 
with all information, suggestions and recommendations regarding Employer's 
business, of which Employees have knowledge, that will be of benefit to 
Employer. 
5. CONFIDENTIALITY. Employees recognizes that Employer has and will have 
information regarding the following: 
-costs 
-future plans 
-processes 
-trade secrets 
-copyrights 
-assets/financial information 
-computer processes, programs and codes 
-distribution locations 
Employees will not at any time or in any manner, either directly or indirectly 
divulge, disclose, or communicate any information to any third party without 
the written consent of the Employer. Employees will protect the information 
and treat it as strictly confidential. 
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6. VACATION. Full time Employees will receive 1 week vacation after 1 year of 
employment with salary paid in full. 2 years of employment will receive 8 days 
vacation time off with salary paid in full. 3 years of employment will receive 
10 days vacation time off with salary paid in full. 4 years of employment will 
receive 12 days vacation time off with salary paid in full and 5 or more years 
of employment will receive 3 weeks of vacation time off with salary paid in 
full. 
7. HOLIDAYS. Employees shall be entitled to the following holidays with pay 
during each calendar year: 
-New Year's Day 
-Memorial Day 
-Independence Day 
-Labor Day 
-Thanksgiving Day 
-Christmas Eve 
-Christmas Day 
8. OTHER BENEFITS. After 1 year of employment: 
-Paid medical and dental insurance. 
-Family leave and Medical leave. 
-Military leave. 
-Jury leave. 
-Recreational Activities (Upon approval of Employer) 
-Automobile maintenance and upkeep. 
-Automobile gasoline for employment duties. 
-Retirement at age 65 for 10 years in the amount of $600 per week. 
9. SEVERANCE PAY. Severance pay is only due to employees that have been a 
employee for 5 years or more. If after working for the Thrifty Nickel in a 
faithful and acceptable manner and later wrongfully terminated without cause, 
Employees shall be paid as severance compensation by calculating the salary 
made in the previous twelve (12) months and dividing it by 52 weeks to get a 
weekly rate of pay for a period of the lesser of the remaining portion of the 
initial term or six (6) months from the date of such termination provided. 
However, that if Employee is employed by a new employer during such period, 
the severance compensation payable to Employee during such period will be 
reduced by the amount of compensation that Employee actually receives from the 
new employer. Employee may in Employee's sole discretion, by delivery of a 
notice to Employer within thirty (30)days following a termination elect to 
receive from Compensation a lump sum severance payment by bank cashier's check 
equal to the present value of the flow of cash payments that would otherwise 
be paid to Employee pursuant to this section. Employee shall continue to enjoy 
any benefits under any plans of the Employer in which Employee is a 
participant to the full extent of Employee's rights under such plans, 
including any perquisites provided under this Agreement, through the remaining 
term of this Agreement; provided, however, that the benefits under any such 
plans of the Employer in which Employee is a participant, including any such 
perquisites, shall cease upon re-employment by a new employer. 
ADDENDUM C 
10. PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS. Employer's obligation to pay Employees the 
compensation and to make the arrangements provided herein shall be 
unconditional, and Employee shall have no obligation whatsoever to mitigate 
damages hereunder. If litigation after termination without cause shall be 
brought to enforce or interpret any provision contained herein, Employer, to 
the extent permitted by applicable law, indemnifies Employees for Employee's 
reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred in such litigation. 
11. INDEMNIFICATION. In addition to any rights to indemnification to which 
Employee is entitled to, Employer shall indemnify Employee at all times during 
and after the term of this Agreement or any successor provision thereof and 
any other applicable state law, and shall pay Employees expenses in defending 
any civil or criminal action, suit, or proceeding, to the maximum extent 
permitted under such applicable state laws. 
a. AGREEMENT. The act of coming to^ -a mutual understanding between two 
(2) or more competent;^ p-aT5ties>£o do or not to do certain 
consideration (s) ./^ / // 
EMPLOYE 
EMPLOYEE 
EMPLOYEE 
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Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801 539-0044 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR AFFIDAVIT OF JOSE S. SALAZAR 
Plaintiffs 
-vs- Judge Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, District Court Civil No. 000906212 
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah 
Corporation, ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and 
NORMAN WILKINSON 
Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Jose S. Salazar, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the matters 
stated herein. 
2. I have been an employee of various Thrifty Nickel companies in New Mexico and Utah 
since 1982. 
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3. I was induced to continue my employment with Thrift Nickel companies by moving to 
Utah to help develop Thrifty Nickel of Orem. A central part of that inducement was 
the security gained by way of an Employment Agreement. 
4. I personally signed the Employment Agreement agreeing to comply with the terms 
thereof. Tim Taylor and my wife Mildred also signed the Employment Agreement. 
5. I have worked for several Thrifty Nickel companies over the last nineteen years. The 
Employment Agreement was made in the name of Thrifty Nickel rather than any one of 
the specific Thrifty Nickel companies to provide future flexibility. 
6. It is my understanding that Robert L. Christensen approved the Employment 
Agreement, was fully aware of the need for it and of its terms. 
7. I have, over the past nineteen years, had a close and cordial personal relationship with 
Robert L. Christensen, been invited to his home for family and holiday meals, worked 
directly with him on projects, and loyally worked to build up his companies. 
8. Norm Wilkerson, a Thrifty Nickel executive, reaffirmed the validity of the Employment 
Agreement when he came to my home in August of 1999 and told me the job, salary, 
and other working conditions would be the same even though the name of the 
company was going to change. 
9. Robert L. Christensen reaffirmed the validity of the Employment Agreement at the 
State Street office in August of 1999 when, at yet another switching of Thrifty Nickel 
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companies, he said to me, " All will be the same. 
i DATED this AL day of January, 2001. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J L day of January, 2001. 
<1M 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
r 
Residing in _i 
UX/ M— 
My Commission Expires 
:%8^kfffljuJz^ 
* j * * * ^ ^ Notary Pubfc • 
I / ^ J S ^ \ CAMfLLE J. CANC€S I 
1 /* i?P$^& *\ S565 South 9O0 East i 
i £ \ ; € Z Sal- L^e Crty, Utah 84117 J 
, Ti* 0^ j? October 25 20G1 I 
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ADDENDUM E 
Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801 539-0044 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR AFFIDAVIT OF MILDRED O. 
SALAZAR 
Plaintiffs 
-vs- Judge Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, District Court Civil No. 000906212 
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah 
Corporation, ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and 
NORMAN WILKINSON 
Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Mildred O. Salazar, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the matters 
stated herein. 
2. I have been an employee of various Thrifty Nickel companies in New Mexico and Utah 
since 1982. 
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3. I was induced to continue my employment with Thrift Nickel companies by moving to 
Utah to help develop Thrifty Nickel of Orem. A central part of that inducement was 
the security gained by way of an Employment Agreement. 
4. I personally signed the Employment Agreement agreeing to comply with the terms 
thereof. Tim Taylor and my husband Jose also signed the Employment Agreement. 
5. I have worked for several Thrifty Nickel companies over the last nineteen years. The 
Employment Agreement was made in the name of Thrifty Nickel rather than any one of 
the specific Thrifty Nickel companies to provide future flexibility. 
6. It is my understanding that Robert L. Christensen approved the Employment 
Agreement, was fully aware of the need for it and of its terms. 
7. I have, over the past nineteen years, had a close and cordial personal relationship with 
Robert L. Christensen, been invited to his home for family and holiday meals, worked 
directly with him on projects, and loyally worked to build up his companies. 
8. Norm Wilkerson, a Thrifty Nickel executive, reaffirmed the validity of the Employment 
Agreement when he came to our home in August of 1999 and told us the job, salary, 
and other working conditions would be the same even though the name of the 
company was going to change. 
9. Robert L. Christensen reaffirmed the validity of the Employment Agreement at the 
State Street office in August of 1999 when, at yet another switching of Thrifty Nickel 
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companies, he said to me, "All will be the same. 
DATED this J L day of January, 2001. 
](]^^f// rf Ardktf**' 
Mildred O. Salazar 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J L day of January, 2001. 
NOTARY PUBXIC 
Residing in 
My Commission Expires 
fftUm Lfim^Y 
I ftjjMt^A 5565 Sex* 900 E*s* | 
J \ \ V t f * * / ^ October 25 2001 I 
1 v
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ADDENDUM 
Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
136 East South Temple 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
n= ., if] [ 
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By 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR AFFIDAVIT OF TIM TAYLOR 
Plaintiffs 
-vs- Judge Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, et. District Court Civil No. 000906212 
al. 
Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Tim Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the matters 
stated herein. 
2. I personally drafted the Employment Agreement between Thrifty Nickel and Jose and 
Mildred Salazar dated 1/1/92 and attached hereto. 
3. The subject Employment Agreement was provided by Thrifty Nickel both to induce 
/viui-yr/iNi^uivi r 
the Salazars to move from New Mexico to Utah and to reward them for their years of 
service in New Mexico. 
4. The subject Employment Agreement was suggested by, discussed around the table 
with, and approved by my father, Robert L. Christensen and his wife / my Mother 
Mary. 
5. I signed the subject Employment Agreement as an agent for my father, Robert L. 
Christensen and as President of Thrifty Nickel of Orem. 
6. The Thrifty Nickel empire is made up of a large number of affiliated companies 
throughout the United States. Many of these companies are transitory in nature, being 
used for various purposes, at various times, in various localities. All or most of these 
companies are owned or controlled by my Father, Robert L. Christensen. I have been 
an officer in several of these companies. 
7. The subject Employment Agreement was purposely made in the name of Thrifty 
Nickel rather than any of the many companies making up the Thrifty Nickel empire to 
provide flexibility in case the Salazars where shifted or transferred from one company 
to another within the Thrifty Nickel organization. 
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8. Since the subject Employment Agreement was executed, the Salazars have worked for 
Thrifty Nickel of Orem, Thrifty Nickel of Salt Lake City, Southern Cross, and possible 
other Thrifty Nickel companies. 
• * \ 
DATED this ^ "day of January, 2001 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this V^day of January, 2001. 
Notary Public-State Of Nevada 
COUNTY OF CLARK 
ELSA PACIS OGLESBY 
My Appointment Expires 
No. 00^544-1 March 22, 2004 NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in 
My Commission Expires: 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Scott A. Call, #0544 
James H. Tily, #8809 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801)364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert L. Christensen 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. ) 
SALAZAR, ) 
) DEFENDANT CHRISTENSEN'S 
Plaintiffs, ) MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. ) 
THIRFTY NICKLE OF OREM, INC., a ) Civil No. 000906212 
Utah corporation; WANT ADS OF SALT ) Judge Frederick 
LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah corporation; ) 
SOUTHERN CROSS, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation; ROBERT L. ) 
CHRISTENSEN, an individual; and ) 
NORMAN WILKINSON, an individual, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendant Robert L. Christensen ("Christensen"), by and through his undersigned 
counsel, respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint against Christensen for failure to state 
DEC 2 9 2000 
Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
136 East South Temple 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANT 
ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN BY MAIL 
Plaintiffs 
-vs- Judge Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, District Court Civil No. 000906212 
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah 
Corporation, ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and 
NORMAN WILKINSON 
Defendants 
Plaintiffs Jose S. and Mildred O. Salazar ("Salazar") by and through their attorney Conrad B. 
Houser, submit this U.R.C.P. 4(g) MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANT ROBERT L. 
CHRISTENSEN BY CERTIFIED MAIL based on the following: 
1. Robert L. Christensen is aware of the subject lawsuit. He has seen or been told in detail 
of its claims and damage requests. He has responded through others to the Plaintiffs 
that "they will never get a penny out of him." 
2. Robert L. Christensen's lawyer is likely to be the same attorney who represents Souther 
Cross, Inc. and Norman Wilkinson, namely Scott A. Call. Plaintiff's lawyer requested 
that he accept service on behalf of Mr. Christensen but he was not given authority by 
Mr. Christensen to do so. 
3. Over a period of 24 days process service George C. Duke attempted to serve Robert L. 
AUVENuum n 
Christensen. His log is attached as a DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE. Mr. Duke 
concluded on several occasions that Mr. Christensen was "evading/7 He left business 
cards but Mr. Christensen did not respond. 
4. Good cause exists to believe that Robert L. Christensen is avoiding service of process. 
Plaintiffs therefore requests the Clerk of this Court to serve him by mail as provided in 
Rule 4(g) of the U.R.CP. 
Dated this 6th day of November, 2000. 
Conrad B. Houser 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR, et al, : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 000906212 CN 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL, INC., et al, : Date: December 6, 2000 
Defendant(s), : 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit for Decision filed December 4, 2000, the Court rules as 
follows: 
1. There being no timely opposition, Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Alternate Service is granted. 
2. The order submitted is executed December 6, 2000. 
Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0044 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR 
Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories 
-vs- Judge Dennis Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL INC, a Utah Corporation, et District Court Civil No. 000906212 
al. 
Defendants 
Plaintiffs, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, submit the following Interrogatories to defendant Robert L. Christensen. These 
interrogatories are to be responded to by defendant Robert L. Christensen within 30 days of 
the date of service. If objection is made to any Interrogatory herein, or any part thereof 
defendants are hereby requested to set forth with particularity specific objection as to each 
part 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE 
These Interrogatories are to be deemed continuing in nature so as to require 
supplemental responses should additional information be received between 
the time responses are made and the time of trial. 
INTERROGATORY #1, Were you involved in any way in the incorporation of any of 
the defendant corporations listed in his lawsuit? Is so, state each and every way in which you 
were involved in the incorporation of each. 
INTERROGATORY #2. Do you now or did you previously own stock in any 
corporation that is listed as a defendant in tins lawsuit? If so, state the number of shares you 
own now or have owned at any and all times and the percentage of your ownership as 
measured against the total outstanding shares of each respective corporation attendant to each 
ownership position. 
INTERROGATORY #3. Did you have any input into the making of or knowledge of 
the existence of the Employment Agreement with plaintiffs? If so, state your involvement in 
creating the Agreement and at what times and under what circumstances you had knowledge 
of the Agreements. 
INTERROGATORY #4, Have you ever served as a director, officer, or representative of 
any of the defendants in this lawsuit? If so, state the name of each such position and the date 
on which you assumed any such position and the date on which you left any such position 
INTERROGATORY #5- Did you ever loan money to any of the defendant corporations 
in this lawsuit? If so, state: 
(A) The date and amount of each such loan. 
(B) The balance stilled owed on each loan. 
INTERROGATORY #6. Did any of the defendant corporations loan you any money? If 
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so, state: 
(A) The date and amount of each such loan. 
(B) The balance still owed on any loan if any. 
INTERROGATORY #7. Did you ever guaranty or cosign any obligation of any of the 
defendant corporations in this lawsuit? If so, state: 
(A) The date and amount of each such cosignature or loan. 
(B) The balance still owed on any loan if any. 
INTERROGATORY #8. Did any of the defendants listed in this lawsuit ever advance 
funds to you for services to be performed later? If so, please state the amount of money 
advanced to you by any defendant in this case and the amount of money that was advanced to 
you on each occasion it was advanced. 
INTERROGATORY #9. At any time since 1996, did you incorporate or cause to he 
incorporated any other corporation? If so, state for each incorporation the name of the 
corporation, the date of the corporation, and the state of incorporation. 
INTERROGATORY #10. For each factual denial set forth in your Answer to the 
Plaintiffs Complaint, state in detail all facts upon which you base such denial, the name, 
home address home telephone number, business address and business telephone number of 
ml witnesses to those facts and the identity of all documents supporting such facts. 
Conrad Houser 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Dated: February 27,2001 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICZ 
I certify that on February 27,2001,1 mailed a copy of these Interrogatories to: 
Attorney Scott A. Call 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Uke City, Utah 84101-2006. 
Conrad B. Houser 
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Conrad B. Houser (3612) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0044 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR 
Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Request for Production of 
Documents 
-vs- Judge Frederick 
THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, et District Court Civil No. 000906212 
al. 
Defendants 
Plaintiffs, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, submit herewith the following Request for Production of Documents to all 
defendants. These requests are to be responded to by all defendants within 30 days of the 
date of service. If objection is made to any requests for Production of Documents, or any part 
thereof defendants are hereby requested to set forth with particularity this specific objection as 
to each part 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE 
These Requests for Production are to be deemed continuing in nature so as to require 
supplemental responses should additional documents or information be received between 
the time the responses are made and the time of trial. 
All documents are to be produced which are in the possession of the individual or 
corporate party, his attorney's, investigators, consultants, experts, agents, employees, or other 
representatives of the names parties and their attorney. 
Photocopies of all documents are requested to be served on the Plaintiff's attorney at 
his office located at 136 East South Temple, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
1. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of THRIFTY NICKEL INC, a Utah 
corporation, et al 
2. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC, 
a Utah Corporation. 
3. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of SOUTHERN CROSS, INC a Utah 
Corporation. 
4. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, INC 
5. A copy of the By-Laws of each corporation listed in paragraph 1 through 4 above. 
6. A copy of the Certificate of Incorporation from the Secretary of the State of Utah of 
each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above. 
7. A copy of the Notice of Incorporation of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 
through 4 above. 
8. Copies of the minutes of all meetings of the Board of Directors of each corporation 
listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above. 
9. Copies of all minutes of shareholders of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 
through 4 above. 
10. Copies of all documents evidencing loans from Robert L. Christensen to each 
Page 2 of 5 
ziuuniNJJUivi 1 
corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above. 
11 Copies of all documents evidencing loans from any family member, relative or 
friend of Robert L. Christensen or any business affiliated with Robert L. Christensen to each 
corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above. 
12. Copies of all documents evidencing loans by each corporation listed in paragraphs 
1 through 4 above to any family member, relatives or friend of Robert L. Christensen or to any 
business affiliated with Robert L. Christensen. 
13. Copies of corporate records or ledgers evidencing the identity and address of each 
person or entity who has owned stock in each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 
above during the past five years, the consideration paid or promised for he stock and the 
dates on which the consideration was paid or promised. 
14. Copies of corporate records or ledgers evidencing the issuance of actual stock 
certificates at any time since the incorporation of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 
through 4 above to whom they were issued and the dates of issue, 
15. For each bank account maintained in the name of each corporation listed in 
paragraphs 1 through 4 above, a copy of the monthly statement for the period beginning 
January 1,1996 through March 1,2001 
16. Copies of the federal tax returns of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 
4 above, including all schedules and attachments, for each of the past five years beginning 
with 19%. 
17. Copies of any reports prepared by experts or consultants whom any defendant 
intends to call at trial or rely on at trial. 
18. Copies of any reports prepared by investigators or consultants of any of the 
defendants. 
19. Copies of any exhibits the defendants intends to offer at trial 
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Conrad Houser 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Dated: February 27,2001 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on February 27,2001,1 mailed a copy of this Request for Production of 
Documents by first class mail to: 
Attorney Scott A. Call 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake Ciiy, Utah 84101-2006. , r\ 
Conrad B. Houser 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
Case No. 000906212 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
(Videotape Proceedings^ 
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED 
O. SALAZAR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, 
INC., WAND ADS OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, SOUTHERN 
CROSS, INC., ROBERT L. 
CHRISTENSEN and NORMAN 
WILKINSON, 
Defendants. 
-oOo-
March, 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of/2001, 
commencing at the hour of 9:08 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE J. DENNIS 
FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for 
the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
videotape proceedings were had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs: CONRAD B. HOUSER 
Attorney at Law 
136 East South Temple 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendants: SCOTT A. CALL 
Attorney at Law 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West 300 South, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IMPY 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
to what Mr* Christensen's real involvement is. They are 
adequately pled and we feel like this case is properly before 
the Court and should proceed through the rest of the 
discovery process. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Houser. 
On a motion to dismiss, the issue of the equitable 
nature of the claims asserted by the respective parties is 
really beyond the scheme of my inquiry here, Mr. Houser. 
From my perception of the way that the complaint is 
alleged—alleges causes of action, it seems to me that 
there's no question that Mr. Christensen's motion to dismiss 
is well taken. There are insufficient allegations, in my 
estimation, to give proper and fair notice of the claim of 
alter ego or an intent by the plaintiffs to pierce a 
corporate veil. 
All that's alleged is that Mr. Christensen was an 
owner, that he had knowledge of the contract and has—as both 
counsel have pointed out, the sum total of the allegations 
incident to Christensen's involvement here do not give fair 
notice of a claim of attempt to breach corporate veil; ergo, 
the motion to dismiss is granted for the reasons specified in 
the supporting memoranda. 
You prepare the appropriate order, Mr. Call. 
MR. CALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
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